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Abstract 
Over time, gender and politics research has made progress in identifying those factors that 
result in low numbers of women in political institutions and in making evidence-informed 
suggestions about how to ameliorate them. These factors include discrimination in party 
recruitment processes, male-dominated political culture, and broader gender inequalities in 
society. In contrast, we know little of public opinion regarding these drivers of women’s 
political under-representation, especially whether to who or what women assign blame for the 
under-representation of women in politics differs from men. In this paper we provide the first 
discussion and analysis of blame assignment for women’s numeric under-representation in 
politics. In doing so, we outline and operationalise a framework that distinguishes between 
meritocratic explanations of women’s under-representation, whereby the blame for women 
not holding political office in greater numbers is assigned to women themselves, and 
structural explanations, whereby social forces external to women are seen to result in their 
numeric under-representation. We use cross-national data from 27 European countries to 
show that women are significantly more likely than men to assign blame for women’s 
numeric under-representation to structural factors. Further, we exploit the hierarchical nature 
of our dataset using multilevel models and find significant differences in levels of structural 
blame assignment between countries as well as between-country variation in the probability 
of women assigning blame to structural explanations for women’s under-representation. 
Finally, we disaggregate the category of structural explanations to assess their relative 
prominence and provide strong corroborative evidence that women predominantly assign 
blame for women’s under-representation to political culture over other structural blame 
factors. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for policymakers 
contemplating the pursuit of gender equality policies aimed at increasing women’s political 
representation and make suggestions for the direction of future research in this area.  
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The numeric under-representation of women in politics across the world has long concerned 
scholars.1 Over time, research has made progress in identifying those factors that result in low 
numbers of women in political institutions and in making evidence-informed suggestions 
about how to ameliorate them.2 In contrast, we know little of broader attitudes regarding the 
causes of women’s political under-representation, especially whether who or what women 
blame for the under-representation of women in politics differs from men.3 In other fields, 
patterns of blame assignment for social outcomes have been shown to relate closely to 
opinions regarding the desirability and nature of any kind of intervention designed to alter 
those outcomes.4 As such, they have consequences for the incentives offered to political 
                                                
1 For recent reviews see Lovenduski (2005) and Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes (2007). 
2  In diagnosing the causes there have been studies of women’s political ambition (Lawless 
and Fox 2005; 2010), candidate selection processes (Norris and Lovenduski 1995), political 
institutions (Curtin 2014), political parties (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Childs and Webb 2012) and 
voters (Dolan 2014). In terms of solutions, further studies of political parties and gender 
quotas have dominated the literature (Krook 2009; Dahlerup 2013; Kenny 2013; O’Brien 
2015), as well as considerations of the role of societal women’s movements (Paxton, Hughes, 
and Green 2006; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015). 
3 There are some exceptions, such as Mari Teigen and Lena Wängnerud’s study of how elites 
consider the question of women’s under-representation in Norway and Sweden (2009). As far 
as we are aware, however, no study to date focuses exclusively on the domain of politics 
when exploring blame assignment for women’s under-representation. 
4 This has been discussed extensively in the welfare policy literature. Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005) find that individuals who believe in a meritocratic society are averse to policies 
increasing wealth redistribution For further examples of findings that similarly link a belief in 
meritocracy and the notion of putting in effort to get one’s ‘just deserts’ with support for 
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actors when choosing whether to seek reform in a policy area and the likelihood of gender 
equality measures being pursued by actors will likely be at least partly reliant on dominant 
understandings of the causes of women’s persistent numeric under-representation in politics.  
 
In this paper we provide the first systematic discussion and analysis of blame assignment for 
the specific problem of women’s numeric under-representation in politics. In doing so, we 
outline and operationalise a framework that distinguishes between meritocratic explanations 
of women’s under-representation, whereby the blame for women not holding political office 
in greater numbers is assigned to women themselves, and structural explanations, whereby 
social forces external to women themselves are seen to drive their numeric under-
representation.  
 
We address three research questions: first, to what extent are women significantly more likely 
than men to endorse either structural or meritocratic explanations for women’s under-
representation? Second, do sex differences persist even after taking account of cross-national 
differences in political context, elite cues, and women’s economic and political status? Third, 
is there between-country variation in the extent to which women assign blame to structural 
explanations for women’s political under-representation?5  
                                                                                                                                                  
generally less interventionist or redistributive economic policies see Gilens (1999), Fong 
(2001), McNamee and Miller (2004), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Likki and Staerklé (2015), 
and Coté et al. (2015). 
5Morgan and Buice (2013), in their study of attitudes towards women as political leaders in 
Latin American countries, find that contextual variation in elite cues and women’s economic 
status had clear effects on how women’s political ability was perceived by both men and 
women themselves. 
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Our analysis focuses on countries within the European Union (EU) using Eurobarometer data 
from 27 EU states. Addressing our first research question, we find that women are 
significantly more likely than men to blame structural factors for women’s numeric under-
representation. Turning to our two further research questions, we exploit the hierarchical 
nature of the Eurobarometer dataset and find significant differences in levels of structural 
blame assignment between countries as well as between-country variation in the probability 
of women assigning blame to structural explanations for women’s under-representation. This 
established, we then disaggregate the category of structural explanations and provide strong 
corroborative evidence that women predominantly assign blame for women’s under-
representation to political culture over other structural explanations. Yet, statistically 
speaking, we find women are not significantly more likely to assign blame to political culture 
than to either political parties or society in general. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings and make suggestions for the direction of future research in this 
area.  
 
Scholarly explanations of women’s numeric under-representation in politics 
The growth of feminist political science brought about a proliferation of research into the 
question of women’s numeric under-representation in politics (Paxton et al. 2007; Campbell 
and Childs eds. 2014). Over time, this research moved from describing how few women were 
in institutions to asking why this was the case, focusing on recruitment by political parties 
and the issue of whether women are generally less politically ambitious than men (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Lawless and Fox 2010). The core of many of these 
accounts is the model of supply and demand, expressing the idea that women’s numeric 
under-representation might be either the result of low demand for women on the part of 
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political parties and institutions, or of a weakened supply of women putting themselves 
forward for political office (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). This distinction resembles one 
made in the social psychology literature when seeking to understand public opinion regarding 
social outcomes like occupational status and wider labour market success (Olson and Hafer 
2001; Cech and Blair-Loy 2010). This literature distinguishes between meritocratic 
explanations for unequal social outcomes, which assume ‘that those with the requisite 
training, experience, and personal motivation will succeed in a meritocratic society, while 
those who fall behind have only themselves to blame’, and structural explanations which see 
social inequality as the ‘result of structural factors such as discrimination, stereotyping, and 
exclusion from social networks’ (Cech and Blair-Loy 2010, p.371; also see Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006).6 Here, we adapt this framework for use in the study 
of the numeric under-representation of women in politics, classifying six of the broad 
explanations put forward in the existing academic literature as either meritocratic or structural 
in nature (see Table 1 for summary).7 
 
Meritocratic explanations for women’s numeric under-representation 
                                                
6 It is also possible to see these varying explanations as rooted in different varieties of 
feminist thought. For example, we can see similarities to the differences that Teigen and 
Wängnerud (2009, p.29) highlight between ‘radical’ versus ‘liberal’ feminist explanations for 
women’s under-representation, the former which emphasise the role of structural barriers 
facing women and the latter which focus on the individual choices of women themselves. 
7 Of course, social scientific evidence has shown the meritocratic arguments presented here 
are, at root, also often the result of structural barriers that prevent women from participating 
in politics at the same rate as men. However, our aim here is instead to understand exactly 
who does offer support for these explanations rather than to interrogate their accuracy. 
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The most notable meritocratic explanation for women’s under-representation in politics is the 
belief that the low number of women in politics is a consequence of the choices of women 
themselves. On this view, women are simply not that interested in running, or in politics as a 
whole, are too lazy to put themselves forward, are unable to effectively undertake the tasks 
expected of a candidate, or are in some other way to blame for their own numeric under-
representation (Lawless and Fox 2005). This is not a view generally expressed by those 
writing in the academic literature, but rather is one encountered by researchers when carrying 
out their work within political parties and institutions.8 It also mirrors narratives of ‘it’s their 
choice’ that researchers have found when exploring the tension between domestic and 
occupational duties found by women in high-intensity professional jobs (Beddoes and Pawley 
2014). Such narratives effectively recuse dominant groups from having to consider the 
possibility that purportedly neutral working norms affect some employees more negatively 
than others by placing the blame for unequal outcomes on the voluntary choices of those who 
lose out (Blair-Loy 2003).  
 
The meritocratic view that the blame for women’s numeric under-representation can be laid 
at their own door has gained some succour from a body of research on the gender gap in 
political interest (Norris et al. 2004). For example, multiple studies have found women to be 
                                                
8 For example, Norris and Lovenduski report an incident whereby a woman candidate for the 
Conservative party at the 1992 British General Election was asked ‘Where are your babies?’ 
and ‘Where is your husband?’ (1995, p.128). They also report the testimony of women 
candidates who were told they were not selected because it would not be safe for them to 
campaign in the ‘rougher’ parts of the constituency (1995, p.128). For further examples see 
Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) who recount the experiences of many women who have run 
for political office in the United States. 
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less politically knowledgeable than men, though it has equally been shown that these surveys 
themselves might be constructed in ways that undervalue the kinds of political knowledge 
women might have relative to those more commonly expressed by men (Burns et al. 2001; 
Stolle and Gidengil 2010). However, further studies have shown that women are less 
interested in formal electoral campaigns than men and are less likely to discuss politics with 
family and friends (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Similarly, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) 
found evidence of gender gaps across various forms of participation. Although scholars 
generally do not simply take these findings as justifications for women’s numeric under-
representation, some might see them in that way and assume that if women are not as 
interested in formal institutional politics as men, it is their fault they are not there in equal 
numbers to them. 
 
A second related but different meritocratic explanation, specifically for women’s under-
representation in national-level political bodies, is the idea that women might be more 
interested in local politics than national politics, and therefore that the low numbers of 
women in national legislatures is not a problem to be fixed, but a result of women’s 
preferences (Coffé 2013). 
 
Structural explanations of women’s numeric under-representation in politics 
The main focus of the existing academic literature has been on three structural factors – 
political institutions, political parties, and political culture.9 The modal explanation for 
                                                
9 Our aim here, and in the classification we utilise in our analysis, is to parsimoniously 
incorporate as much of the existing literature as possible into our exploration of blame 
assignment. Although such an effort is bound to exclude certain sections of the subfield, our 
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women’s numeric under-representation in this literature is that political parties are not doing 
enough to get more women to be candidates for their party (Norris 1997; Kenny and Verge 
2013). Variously, it has been shown that parties operate under both formal and informal rules 
that exclude women candidates to the benefit of men (Kenny 2013), that parties place great 
weight on apparently sex-neutral criteria that similarly act to the detriment of women 
candidates (Murray 2014), and that they resist feminization (Childs and Webb 2012). 
 
Political institutions have had similar accusations laid at their feet by academic research. 
Many legislative environments are deemed archaic and thus off-putting to women (Puwar 
2004; Rai 2010), have informal conventions that exclude women from certain influential 
spaces or rituals (Mackay et al. 2010), and are seen to be resistant to changing working 
practices that might make the job of being a politician more family-friendly, broadly defined 
(Allen et al. 2016). 
 
Along these same lines, political culture as a whole has often been blamed for not including 
women in the same way it does men. The media, for example, have been accused on multiple 
occasions of treating women candidates differently to men, mostly in a more negative or 
tokenistic way (Hall and Donaghue 2013). Similarly, the dominant political culture in most 
advanced democracies has been identified as one that normalises the presence of men and 
treats women as ‘other’ (Murray 2014). Consequently, when women seek to disrupt existing 
male dominance, their quality or skills as a politician are judged according the most common 
characteristics of the primarily male politicians who went before them. As such, any unique 
or distinct skills, abilities, or behaviours that women might contribute at a greater frequency 
                                                                                                                                                  
preference was to focus on the wider themes of existing research and to direct readers to the 
source articles for more intensive consideration of the issues at hand. 
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than men are not valued on their own terms, but rather seen only as not being the same (and 
often not as desirable) as those predominant among men (Murray 2014).  
 
Some scholars have identified society as a whole as a possible culprit when looking for an 
explanation for women’s numeric under-representation. Research has extensively chronicled 
how the process of gendered socialization results in girls and women of seemingly all ages 
having less interest in running for political office that equivalently matched boys and men 
(Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). Lawless and Fox describe 
traditional gender socialization as ‘the greater complexities of women’s lives, in terms of 
both how society perceives them and the manner in which they perceive themselves as 
eligible candidates’ (2010, p.9).  Similarly, a consistent finding across advanced democracies 
is that, despite women’s advances in the economic sphere and some convergence in the 
amount of time both sexes spend on unpaid labour, women are still disproportionately likely 
to undertake the majority of domestic and caring duties within the home, leaving them less 
time than men for the social activities necessary to mount a successful political career (Kan et 
al. 2011).  
 
Hypothesizing about beliefs regarding women’s numeric under-representation 
Given the range of explanations for women’s under-representation that are available for 
individuals to endorse, we do not expect patterns of blame assignment to be uniform across 
the population. We utilise existing theories around public opinion on gender issues, structural 
critiques of gender roles, broader system justification, and personal lived experience in line 
with these theories to discuss how this might affect blame assignment. We begin by 
discussing our expectations at the individual-level before moving to discuss the possible 
influence of contextual factors. 
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Gender role change issues 
Burns and Gallagher identify gender role change issues as those related to the place of 
women in society in a larger sense. Gelb and Palley (1982, p.6) note that ‘role change issues 
appear to produce change in the dependent female role of wife, mother, and homemaker, 
holding out the potential of greater sexual freedom and independence in a variety of 
contexts’. Sanbonmatsu echoes these ideas, writing ‘some gender issues are more inherently 
about gender roles . . . than others. I consider women’s role in the economy, the workplace, 
and politics as debates that are primarily about gender roles’ (2002, pp.12-13).  
 
We expect individual’s views regarding women’s current numeric under-representation in 
political office to reflect their predispositions regarding women’s overall place in society 
(Burns and Gallagher 2010). Traditional dispositions regarding gender roles are likely to be 
associated with traditional behaviours, most notably marriage (Kane and Whipkey 2009). As 
Kane and Whipkey (2009: p.239) note, ‘gender scholars have documented [that] the family is 
a key site of gender inequality, a social structure that tethers women’s interests to men’s 
within households’. Predispositions regarding traditional gender roles may also lack variation 
along the lines of sex for this same reason; the fact that men and women live closely 
interrelated lives, with individual beliefs about women’s societal role often being shared by 
couples and families (Risman 2004). As such, it could be that married individuals of both 
sexes are more likely to eschew structural explanations for women’s numeric under-
representation in politics and instead express support for meritocratic explanations. 
 
However, wider variation in this predisposition is likely a result of other core beliefs, such as 
political ideology or partisanship (Burns and Gallagher 2010, p.437). Consequently, we 
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might expect individuals on the right of the political spectrum, holding more conservative 
social views, to consider women’s numeric-under-representation in political institutions as a 
logical consequence of women’s proper societal role, leaving the public sphere largely to men 
(Sanbonmatsu 2002).  
 
Structural critique 
A further idea relevant to our study is that of structural critique, or ‘the notion that inequality 
is socially created and sustained through systemic discrimination…an awareness that 
outcomes are a result of systematic, structural disadvantage’ (Burns and Gallagher 2010, 
p.435). Burns and Gallagher discuss how the notion of structural critique calls members of a 
group to offer ‘a critique of existing relations’ and an account ‘of one group’s disadvantaged 
position such that the causal forces responsible for the disadvantage lie outside the group 
itself, in patterns of social discrimination or institutional bias’ (2010, p.435). This offers a 
framework for thinking about initial variation in blame assignment for women’s under-
representation between the sexes. Scholars have discussed how, through daily lived 
experience, women are more likely than men to accumulate evidence in support of a critique 
focused on structural explanations for women’s numeric political under-representation (Gurin 
1985; Davis and Robinson 1991). For example, women are still more likely than men to be 
responsible for domestic, family and childcare tasks. And as emphasised above, there is 
growing evidence that such responsibilities have a detrimental effect on the political 
ambitions and recruitment of women to legislatures (Lawless, 2012). 
 
This effect is likely to be especially pronounced among women who have had access to 
higher levels of education, existing research finding a link between the recognition of 
structural inequality and education (Kane 1995) as well as the ‘rejection of victim-blaming 
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explanations for inequality’ (Kane and Kyyrö 2001). Equally, we might expect that women 
who have sought out full-time employment, and thus are more likely to have encountered 
structural barriers to occupational progression, to favour structural explanations of women’s 
numeric under-representation (Cech and Blair-Loy 2010). Structural critique is equally 
something available to men (Burns and Gallagher 2010). As such, men might well arrive at a 
structural critique along similar lines to those of women, but they are less likely to have done 
so through their own directly-lived experience. As Davis and Robinson note in their 
‘underdog thesis’, those individuals who suffer from the structural inequality in question are 
more likely to notice it than those who are not directly implicated (1991). Based on findings 
that higher levels of education lead to lower levels of victim-blaming when explaining social 
inequality, it is more likely that men with higher levels of education would theorize in this 
way (Kane and Kyyrö 2001). This said, though, we still expect to see a broad sex difference 
whereby women are more likely to blame structural factors for women’s numeric under-
representation, while men will be more likely to focus on meritocratic explanations.  
 
System justification 
However, it seems equally plausible, based on existing evidence, that women who have 
achieved success in the workplace or in education may favour meritocratic explanations for 
social outcomes. In line with the expectations of system justification theory, individuals who 
have succeeded under the status quo are likely to see it as legitimate and ‘good, fair natural 
desirable, and even inevitable’ (Jost et al. 2004, p.887). As Jackman and Muha note, highly 
educated members of discriminated groups can act as ‘state of the art apologists’ for the 
system which has allowed them to succeed (1984, p.752).  
 
For men, system justification is likely to be more of a default position than it is for women. 
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As Kane writes (1998, p.612), men have ‘greater control over resources, over most social 
institutions, and over the construction of social meaning’. Men might be actively unwilling to 
cede this control but, given that this control results in the patterns of dependence at the heart 
of wider sex inequality, it may also ‘tend to draw women toward men’s interpretations of 
gender inequality’ (Kane 1998, p.614).  As such, even when there might not appear to be a 
gender gap in views on gender role issues, this might not necessarily be indicative of rising 
feminist consciousness. 
 
The influence of elite cues 
Existing scholarship suggests that elite cues can shape attitudes on issues relating to gender 
equality through their conduct and can play a vital role in a number of ways: proposing 
and/or implementing policies and programs; communicating to the public on issues of 
equality; and appointing individuals from traditionally under-represented groups in society to 
high-profile political roles (Kittilson 2010; O’Brien and Rickne 2016). As a consequence, the 
implementation of measures to ensure parity in descriptive representation – most commonly 
in the form of either voluntary or legally-mandated quotas - could be expected to have a 
positive effect on public attitudes towards women in politics either directly, by increasing the 
number of women, or indirectly through residual symbolic effects (Phillips 2012). Women in 
particular might see the implementation of quotas as a quasi-admission of guilt on the part of 
political elites that they previously had not done enough to get women into political office, 
likely related to an increased endorsement of broadly structural explanations for women’s 
numeric under-representation. Existing research offers clear evidence that women and men 
may respond in different ways to such elite cues (Beaman et al, 2009; Morgan and Buice, 
2013). However, it is also plausible that quotas might provoke a backlash among individuals 
who are not sympathetic to structural explanations, predominantly including men, with the 
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adoption of the quota instead causing them to double-down on their prior meritocratic 
leaning. 
 
The presence of a quota may have a further influence if the quota is deemed to have proven 
ineffective in its objectives (Schwindt-Bayer 2009).10 In such cases, we may expect that 
women, who are more likely to hold stronger prior opinions on gender equality based on their 
lived experiences, might interpret the failure of the quota measure as being the result of a lack 
of political will on the part of political elites, political parties, and the political system as a 
whole. 
 
Status discontent theory 
We might expect similar effects to become clear when variation in women’s political and 
economic status is taken account of in our analysis. As Morgan and Buice note, ‘status 
discontent theory would expect women’s empowerment to undermine support for gender 
equity’ (2013, p.646). Although our research focus differs to theirs, the principle stands – in 
countries where women have achieved higher than average levels of political presence and 
attained greater economic influence, we might expect both men and women in those countries 
to be more likely reject structural explanations of women’s numeric under-representation. 
Instead, given the success of seemingly large numbers of women in both politics and 
economically, individuals might instead assume that women can get ahead themselves if they 
                                                
10 This might a case where the quota has not resulted in the anticipated increase in the number 
of women in the legislature in question (Dahlerup 2006), or in some cases where women 
elected as a result of the quota have not been able to effect transformative substantive 
representation in the way that some advocates of the policy expected (Goetz and Hassim 
2003). 
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wish to.  
 
Additionally, as noted by Morgan and Buice, ‘as women make gains, those who face the loss 
of status as a result, namely men, may react against this changing context and retrench to 
embrace more traditional gender norms’ (2013, p.646). In our case, this might be reflected in 
men voicing the opinion that women’s under-representation is the result of women’s personal 
decisions. Critically, any evidence of this kind of backlash would reinforce Morgan and 
Buice’s (2013) finding, and concern, that societal gains for women are not necessarily self-
reinforcing. Based on all of the above, and reflecting our expectations regarding sex 
differences in patterns of blame assignment as well as the expected impact of individual and 
aggregate-level variables we generate our first hypothesis: 
 
H1 – Women will be significantly more likely than men to assign blame to structural 
explanations for women’s numeric under-representation after controlling for 
individual-level and country-level predictors of elite cues and women’s political and 
economic status 
 
Country-level Variation in Women Assigning Blame to Structural Explanations 
Our existing hypotheses focus on individual-level influences, primarily sex, on patterns of 
blame assignment for women’s numeric under-representation in politics. Building on these, 
and reflecting the hierarchical structure of our cross-national dataset where individual 
responses are nested within countries, it is possible to address additional questions: whether 
blame assignment varies by country and the extent to which women assign blame to 
structural explanations for women’s numeric under-representation varies across countries. To 
put it another way, variation in country-level indicators of women’s political and economic 
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status in a country might be expected to affect the extent to which women endorse structural 
explanations of women’s under-representation in politics. Numerous studies, although not 
exploring patterns of blame assignment for women’s under-representation specifically, have 
established a link between the overall life circumstances of women and their propensity to 
adopt feminist views and attitudes (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). 
So, for example, we might expect that the increased inclusion of women in the political and 
economic sphere will result in gender egalitarian attitudes in a broader sense and affect the 
prominence of certain opinions relating to gender roles, structural critique, and status 
discontent discussed above. In the case of the present study, we would expect variation in the 
social and political status of women to manifest in variation in the overall levels of 
assignment of blame for women’s political under-representation to structural rather than 
meritocratic factors even when individual-level variables are taken into account. As such, we 
generate our final two hypotheses: 
 
H2 – There will be significant between-country variation in blaming structural 
explanations for fewer women in politics even after the inclusion of individual-level 
and country-level predictors 
 
H3 – The probability that women will assign blame to structural explanations for 
women’s numeric under-representation will vary across EU countries  
 
Data 
To explore variation in blame assignment for the numeric under-representation of women in 
politics we use Eurobarometer data collected across 27 European countries in February and 
March 2011 as part of Eurobarometer 75.1 (European Commission and European Parliament 
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2013), comprising 24,823 responses. At the time, this included all member states of the 
European Union (EU) (Croatia has since joined the EU in 2013 and the UK is scheduled to 
leave in 2019). The data is also weighted to ensure representativeness across the 27 European 
countries with full details available in the publicly available data files (European Commission 
and European Parliament 2013). 
 
The survey includes a question with a range of response options that can be classified as 
constituting either meritocratic or structural explanations for women’s numeric under-
representation, detailed in Table 1. As with all large-scale surveys, the questions could 
arguably have been altered to more directly address our research question – for example, by 
including a wider range of meritocratic explanation response options. Despite this, the data is 
the only data of its kind currently available and, as such, presents a unique opportunity to 
explore the issue at hand. The question asked respondents to specify their top preference. 
After choosing their top preference, respondents were then asked the same question again and 
were able to choose a maximum of two other responses in addition to their top preference. 
These additional preferences were not ranked. For the purpose of this study, and to guarantee 
accuracy of interpretation, we focus on the top preference.11 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Drawing on the existing academic literature discussed above, we condensed these variables 
into five categories of potential blame from the survey of respondents across 27 EU states. 
                                                
11 For brevity and robustness purposes, we run additional modelling on all responses (these 
are signposted later in the paper) and include tables and figures detailing the results in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 1 indicates whether a response option is classified as a meritocratic (M) or structural 
(S) explanation of women’s numeric under-representation. Across Europe, 79.2% blamed 
structural factors for the descriptive under-representation of women in politics with just over 
20% blaming meritocratic factors. We use a cross-tabulation to assess whether sex (being a 
woman) is associated with, or independent from, blaming structural explanations. More 
women (52.9%) blame structural explanations than the overall female mean (52.0%). The 
Pearson chi-square statistic is 30.11 (p-value 0.000) and a Cramer’s V of 0.04 (p-value 
0.000), indicating a fairly strong association between the two variables.  
 
The descriptive evidence by country is also revealing. Only six of the twenty-seven countries 
(France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Sweden) record higher levels of blame 
assignment to structural explanations than the overall sample population mean (see Table 
A1). However, in the case of Italy, Spain, and Sweden, these are well in excess of 85 per cent 
of the sample population. Conversely, in four countries (Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands), around a third or more assign blame to meritocratic explanations, a notably 
greater figure than the sample population mean across all 27 countries. There is some limited 
evidence of particular trends across different European regions, although it is not fully clear. 
For instance, leaving aside Romania, where those sampled record a higher percentage 
blaming structural explanations than the overall sample population mean, the remaining 
countries sampled from Central and Eastern Europe are below the mean. Across Southern 
Europe - Greece, Italy and Spain - the reverse is true, although those sampled from Portugal 
invoke meritocratic explanations more than the sample population average.12  
 
                                                
12 We find similar patterns to Portugal in Cyprus and Malta however the weighted sample 
size in both these cases is small.  
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The picture is clearer if we extend the analysis and compare by sex (see Table A2). As noted 
above, more women than men invoke structural explanations for women’s descriptive under-
representation in politics, but there are also obvious differences between countries. In 
nineteen of the twenty-seven countries, the percentage of women blaming structural 
explanations is higher than the overall sample population mean. Once again there are some 
regional patterns with women in Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Romania) and 
Southern Europe (excluding Italy) notably more likely to blame structural explanations. The 
story is mixed in Northern Europe with women in six (Denmark, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Luxembourg and Netherlands) of the eleven countries less likely to blame structural 
explanations than the overall sample population mean. Overall, the descriptive evidence 
shows that there is significant between-country variation that needs to be taken into account 
when further analysing the data.    
 
Do Women Assign Blame to Structural Factors? A Multilevel Approach 
The descriptive evidence suggests that more women than men endorsed structural 
explanations for women’s descriptive under-representation in politics and the significant 
association between these two variables, as shown by the previously-reported chi-square test, 
suggests that this relationship may exist across the EU as a whole. Does, however, this sex 
effect hold when other individual-level drivers of women’s numeric under-representation are 
taken into account? Further, is there evidence that the assignment of blame to structural 
explanations varies between countries and, most importantly, that the extent to which women 
blame structural explanations than men also varies from country to country? Our analysis 
therefore needs to firstly take account of individual-level influences to assess the relative 
importance of sex and secondly, given the cross-country nature of our Eurobarometer data, 
include country-level control variables that we expect to affect broader perceptions of women 
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in politics, as discussed above. The data itself is hierarchical in nature, with individual 
responses nested within countries.13 Based on this we initially proceed in two stages. First, 
we test for evidence of a sex effect. Second, we seek to determine whether there is any 
variation across EU countries in the relationship between sex and assigning blame for 
women’s under-representation to structural explanations. 
 
We estimate a series of multilevel logistic models with a dichotomous dependent variable 
indicting the blaming of structural explanations for women’s under-representation, 
safeguarding against any possible underestimation of the random effects or variance 
parameters and biases of the fixed effects (Browne et al. 2005). Before we address the key 
questions, we run a variance components (or null) model to determine whether there is any 
significant between-country variation in assigning blame to structural explanations (see Table 
2). The results align with our earlier descriptive analysis and show significant between-
country variation. Using the latent variable approach (Goldstein and Rasbash 1996), the 
intraclass country correlation is estimated to be 0.12/(012 + 3.29),14 which suggests that 
                                                
13There are clear methodological reasons for taking account of this hierarchical structure. One 
of the major costs of failing to take such an approach is that the standard errors of regression 
coefficients will be underestimated, leading to an exaggeration of statistical significance. 
Also, while it may be possible to take account of group- or country-level effects in the earlier 
models, one of the inevitable consequences would be that any country-level predictor effect 
would be confounded with the effects of these group dummies. Hence, it would not be 
possible to separate out any effects due to observed and unobserved group characteristics. 
Substantively, it makes sense to examine whether sex differences hold when country-level 
predictors are added and to quantify the extent of grouping in individual outcomes. 
14 The standard variance for a logistic distribution is 3.29. 
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around 3.5% of all variation is at the country level, justifying the use of a hierarchical 
modelling procedure.  
Insert Table 2 
 
Of initial interest is whether sex differences hold when individual-level socio-political 
influences are controlled for. To address this question, we specify a series of multivariate 
models the results of which are shown in Table 3. Model 1 in Table 3 reports the intercept 
variance – between-country variation in blaming structural explanations for the under-
representation of women – along with twelve individual-level socio-economic variables, 
including sex, and two political variables.15 In Model 2 (Table 3), we then add a number of 
country-level controls that we might expect to affect perceptions of women in politics, and 
therefore assignation of blame regarding numeric under-representation, testing H1. These 
country-level controls reflect variation in cues offered by political elites regarding women 
and politics in addition to women’s broader political and economic status within a country. 
We measure these by including variables denoting the use of a gender quota in the country, 
the proportion of women in the national legislature, and women’s level of participation in the 
workforce.16 Here, we can also examine country-level variation in blame assignment to 
structural explanations, even after taking account of individual-level and country-level 
predictors, testing H2. Model 3 in Table 3 goes one step further by adding two additional 
random parameters to the model: the slope variance and the covariance between the slope and 
the intercept. It is this model, after taking account of individual- and country-level predictors, 
that addresses whether there is any variability across EU countries in the relationship between 
                                                
15 Full coding details for the 12 socio-economic variables and two political variables used are 
provided in the Appendix. See Table A3 for more details.  
16 Full details of all variables are available in the Appendix, Table A3.  
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sex and blaming structural explanations, testing H3.17 The inclusion of individual 
characteristics in all three models and country level predictors in Models 2 and 3 also allows 
the estimation of the level-2 (country) variances to be conditional on these covariates. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
In all three models, sex remains consistently significant. Women are significantly more likely 
to assign blame to structural explanations than men even when both individual- and country-
level predictors are taken into account, evidence that offers support for H1. In addition, a 
number of other individual-level predictors are statistically significant and align with 
expectations generated in our earlier discussion: those who are married are less likely to 
assign blame to structural explanations, while individuals on the left of the political spectrum 
are significantly more likely to assign blame to structural explanations. When country-level 
predictors are added, countries with greater levels of female workforce participation are less 
likely to assign blame to structural factors. Outside of this, none of the other country-level 
predictors explain support for blaming structural reasons, with neither elite cues nor women’s 
political status appearing to have any noteworthy effect on whether individuals within a 
                                                
17 All the multilevel models are run in Stata 14 using the standard seven integration points. 
We tested higher integration points with little or no evidence of any changes to coefficients 
so we proceed with seven integration points. We specify the cov(unstructured) command for 
Model 3 in order to estimate the covariance between the random intercepts and random 
effects. 
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country are more or less likely to assign blame to structural explanations such as parties, 
elites and political culture.18  
 
Across all three models, the estimate of country variance is small but non-zero and 
significant, justifying the decision to take account of clustering at the country level, and 
supporting H2. Moreover, the likelihood ratio versus logistic regression test is significant 
across all three models reiterating that it would be a mistake to assume cases were 
uncorrelated within clusters. Using the Model 1 results from the random intercept model, we 
can estimate values based on these random intercepts (see Table A4). Our findings are 
consistent with the descriptive evidence presented earlier. We find positive random y-
intercepts which increases the total effect for countries such as Italy, Spain and Sweden but 
negative y-intercepts for other countries – for example, Denmark and the Netherlands - which 
reduces the total effect. In real terms, this suggests a clear pattern of country-level differences 
in blaming structural explanations for the numeric under-representation of women, even after 
taking account of individual-level differences.19 
 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 assume that the probability of blaming structural explanations 
depends on the country of residence as well as individual- and country-level characteristics. 
We achieved this by allowing the model intercept to vary randomly across countries and 
assumed that the effects of individual characteristics such as sex are the same or fixed in each 
                                                
18 We also estimated cross-level interactions between these country-level variables and sex 
and found no significant effect.  
19 We find a similar pattern of country-level differences when both individual- and country-
level variables are controlled for (estimated values from these random intercepts taken from 
Model 2).  
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country. However, it is equally important to consider whether women vary from country to 
country in blaming structural explanations for the under-representation of women, testing H3. 
Model 3 in Table Four extends the random intercept model and tests the effect of adding two 
random parameters - the slope and intercept/slope covariance – to the model conditional on 
individual and country-level predictors. This represents our full model. At the individual 
level, women are 1.3 times more likely to assign blame to structural explanations for 
women’s under-representation in politics. A clearer picture is provided by the average 
marginal effects (see Figure 1).20 Being a woman increases the average probability of 
assigning blame to structural explanations for women’s under-representation by four 
percentage points. Turning to random part of the model, we use a likelihood ratio test to 
determine whether the random slope model is an improvement over the model with a fixed 
slope. This is calculated as two times the difference in log likelihood values between Model 2 
(without the random slope) and Model 3 (with a random slope for ‘woman’). The chi-square 
test statistic is 33.10 on 2 d.f. (p=<0.001) which suggests that the probability of women 
assigning blame to structural reasons does vary across countries, offering support for H4. 
Evidence of a sex effect across countries is reinforced by the significant slope effect which is 
more than twice its standard error. The intercept and slope have a negative correlation across 
countries, one that is not only insignificant but with a value close to zero. In summary, all 
hypotheses have been supported by our analysis. Across the 27 EU member states, women 
predominantly blame structural explanations for the numeric under-representation of women 
in political life. This also holds when country-level predictors are added (H1). We also find 
variation in patterns of blame assignment between countries (H2) and, crucially, the extent to 
                                                
20 Here we report only the significant predictors. On average, being married reduces the 
probability by two percentage points. Those on the left of the political spectrum increase the 
probability of blaming structural explanations by 1.3 percentage points.  
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which women assign blame to structural explanations for women’s under-representation 
varies significantly by country (H3).21  
Insert Figure 1 
 
Comparing Blame Assignment across 27 European Countries 
So far, we have established that women are significantly more likely to assign blame to 
                                                
21 For brevity and as a robustness check, we run the equivalent Multilevel Models where the 
dependent variable is all structural factors (1) against where least one response is meritocratic 
(0) derived from all responses not just the top rank response. We include the same predictor 
variables in the models. In all three models, sex remains consistently significant. Women are 
significantly more likely to blame all structural explanations than men even when both 
individual- and country-level predictors are taken into account, which supports our 
hypotheses. From the equivalent Model 3 (individual-level), women are 1.2 times more likely 
to assign blame to structural explanations for women’s under-representation in politics. Being 
a woman increases the average probability of assigning blame to structural explanations for 
women’s under-representation by five percentage points. We have included the Tables and 
Figures from these models in the Appendix (see Table A5 and Figure A1 AMEs). We also 
run an alternative multinomial model where the three response categorical dependent variable 
compares all structural factors; most responses structural and most responses meritocratic 
using all responses not just the top rank. Again we find clear effects that support are current 
analysis. The probability of women assigning blame for women’s under-representation to all 
structural factors was, on average, two percentage points higher than men. The probability of 
women assigning blame for women’s under-representation to mostly meritocratic categories 
was, on average, three percentage points lower than men (full details in Table A6 and Figure 
A2 in the Appendix).  
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structural explanations for women’s political under-representation than they are to 
meritocratic explanations. However, within this structural category, do women predominantly 
assign blame to elites, parties, political culture, or society at large? Figure Two shows the 
frequencies for each category of blame assignment across the whole sample population of 27 
European countries. More respondents (38.9%) assigned blame to political culture (as their 
top ranked preference). Across Europe, 23.7% assigned blame to women themselves while 
more than a fifth assigned blame to society (stereotyping). In total, just 6% of respondents 
assigned blame to political parties for the lack of women in politics. Exploring possible sex 
differences, of those who assign blame to political culture, 55% were women, 3% higher than 
the overall average. More men assign blame to women and to elites than do women, while the 
sex split for those who assign blame to society and parties barely differs from the average.22 
We run cross-tabulations to assess the relationship between sex and the blame categories 
across the 27 EU countries. Given the descriptive associations noted above, our focus was 
again on whether being a woman is associated with, or independent from, blaming political 
culture. Here, the Pearson chi-square statistic is 58.53 (p-value of 0.000) and a Cramer’s V of 
0.05 (p-value 0.000) indicating a fairly strong association between the two variables. A 
significant negative association between being a woman and assigning blame to elites (chi-
square 12.79, p-value 0.000; Cramer’s V 0.02, p-value 0.000) was also evident.23 
                                                
22 For the whole sample, the weighted split by male and female was 48% and 52% 
respectively. The percentage of women that made up each blame category was as follows: 
52% blamed society; 49% blamed women; 51% blamed parties 51% and 49% blamed elites. 
23 Based on the whole sample, we found no association between being a woman and both 
blaming society (chi-square 0.545, p-value 0.460; Cramer’s V 0.01, p-value 0.460) and 
blaming parties (chi-square 0.419, p-value 0.517; Cramer’s V 0.00, p-value 0.517). Only 
those respondents who blamed structural explanations are included in the subsequent 
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Insert Figure 2 
 
This descriptive evidence suggests that the relationship between sex and assigning blame for 
women’s numeric under-representation to political culture may hold across the EU as a 
whole. Of interest is whether a sex effect remains once other drivers are controlled for. To 
test this, we use a binomial logistic regression to compare those who assign blame to political 
culture with those who assign blame to the other structural categories. As such, our sample 
only contains those respondents who blamed structural explanations for fewer women in 
political life. We use the same individual-level variables as in the previous statistical analysis 
(full model results are provided in Appendix Table A7). Without additional controls, women 
are 1.19 times more likely to blame political culture than men. Even when other individual-
level influences are accounted for, there is still significant evidence of a sex effect with 
women 1.14 times more likely than men to blame political culture. Aside from sex, those 
working at home (including carers, stay-at-home parents, and others involved in intensive 
domestic labour), lower-class manual workers, the unemployed, as well as individuals who 
are retired are all significantly more likely blame political culture. For ease of interpretation 
we convert these logit coefficients (in Table A7 Model 2) into probabilities. We find that the 
average person (where all the independent variables are held at their empirical mean) in our 
                                                                                                                                                  
modelling.  Similar cross-tabulations on this reduced sample yield: positive association 
between being a woman and blaming political culture (chi-square 34.89, p-value 0.00; 
Cramer’s V 0.04, p-value 0.00). For blaming elites and blaming society we find a weak 
negative association and no association between being a woman and blaming parties (as with 
the full sample).  
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sample has a 51.3% chance of blaming political culture for women’s under-representation in 
politics. Figure 4 presents the average marginal effect (AME) – of a one-unit change in terms 
of probability changes for each predictor – for those predictors that are significant at the 5 per 
cent level of confidence. On average, being a manual worker or unemployed increased the 
probability of assigning blame to political culture by six and eight percentage points, 
respectively, when compared to their base categories. For those who were retired it was seven 
percentage points while those who worked at home had a nine percentage point increase in 
the probability of assigning blame to political culture. The AME for women is three per cent: 
on average, the probability of women assigning blame for women’s under-representation to 
political culture was three percentage points higher than for men.  
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
Do women predominantly blame political culture (as our evidence above suggests) or do they 
assign blame for women’s under-representation to other structural explanations? To test 
whether this was the case we first examine the bivariate impact of sex on the three other 
blame categories (elites, parties and society) when they are compared against political culture 
in a multinomial regression. We then run an additional multinomial regression to assess 
whether these findings hold when other predictors are added to the model. A clear pattern 
emerges. Apart from assigning blame to political parties, which has a negative coefficient but 
is insignificant, women were significantly less likely to assign blame to society and elites in 
comparison to political culture (see Table A8). This finding holds for blaming elites when all 
other predictors are added to the model but the effect of the sex variable on blame parties and 
society are below the 95% confidence level although both are negative in direction. As shown 
by the AMEs, the probability of women assigning blame for women’s under-representation to 
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political culture was, on average, three percentage points higher than men (see Figure 4), 
while the probability of assigning blame to elites is around two percentage points lower for 
women than men. Put simply, there is strong corroborative evidence that women across the 
27 EU member states predominantly assign blame for women’s numeric under-representation 
to a male-dominated political culture. However, statistically speaking, women are not 
significantly more likely to assign blame to political culture than to society or to political 
parties.  
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
Conclusion 
This paper offers the first systematic assessment of blame assignment for women’s numeric 
under-representation in politics. We find evidence of a sex difference in blame assignation. 
Most notably, we find that women are significantly more likely than men to assign blame to 
structural explanations for women’s under-representation. Across 27 EU countries, we find 
that this difference is robust to the inclusion of other individual-level socio-political 
variables. Exploring the role of contextual variation in elite cues and women’s economic and 
political status, we similarly find that the sex difference is not altered by these factors. 
Moreover, not only do we find that levels of blame assignment to structural factors varies 
between countries, but that the extent to which women assign blame to structural factors also 
varies significantly by country. Disaggregating the structural blame category, we find 
corroborative evidence that women predominantly assign blame to political culture rather 
than to political parties or society at large.  
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The fact that women predominantly assign blame to political culture can be seen to align with 
the general thrust of the recent and growing literature on feminist institutionalist theory: that 
the political status quo, broadly conceived, is biased against women and acts as a barrier to 
their increased political participation (Mackay et al. 2010). In the same vein, existing cross-
national studies of the extent of feminist consciousness and support for gender equality across 
European countries have also found patterns of country-level variation comparable to our 
own (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Teigen and Wängnerud 2009; Alexander and Welzel 
2010). 
 
We can offer tentative suggestions for the wider implications of our findings. One such 
possible implication regards the likely source of campaigns that seek to bring about the 
implementation of policies designed to increase the numbers of women in politics, such as 
gender quotas. Based on the fact women assign blame to structural factors that they see as 
resulting in women’s under-representation, it seems likely that such interventionist 
campaigns are more likely to be instigated by women than men, perhaps as a result of 
campaigning by the international women’s movement (Paxton et al. 2006). This 
interpretation is in keeping with existing findings from research into attitudes towards welfare 
policies (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; McNamee and Miller 2004; Likki and Staerklé 2015).  
 
It also raises the question of whether the sex difference in attitudes that we find in the general 
population hold for political elites. A further extension might return attention to the general 
public, but instead ask them what they consider to be the likely most effective solution for 
rectifying women’s numeric under-representation. In doing so, scholars could examine 
whether the gender egalitarian attitudes many individuals hold in principle hold when the 
question of implementation arises (Kane and Whipkey 2009). In summary, the more that 
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scholars know about how the public think about these issues, the better the recommendations 
they can provide to policymakers seeking to alleviate gender inequality in the political 
domain. 
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 Tables 
Table 1: Eurobarometer Survey Items on Women’s Political Under-representation 
Question: Which of the following do you think are the 
reasons why women are under-represented in politics? 
Label 
The existence of persistent stereotypes 
 
Blame Society (S) 
The political world is dominated by men who do not value the 
skills of women enough 
The media pay less attention to women than to men during 
election campaigns 
Blame Political Culture 
(S) 
Women are too often placed in disadvantageous positions on 
electoral lists 
Blame Parties (S) 
Women have little interest in this type of career \ do not give 
priority to this type of career 
Women get more interested in local public life than national and 
European public life 
Blame Women (M) 
The measures to encourage parity between women and men in 
politics are ineffective 
Blame Elites (S) 
Key: S = Structural; M = Meritocratic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Variance Components Model (includes ICC): Blaming Structural Explanations 
 
Variables  Model 1 
 β        SE 
Constant    1.24*    0.07 
Random Effects  
Country: Intercept Variance (var_cons)    0.12*    0.04 
Country: ICC    0.03*    0.01 
Model Fit  
Wald Chi-Square <0.05 - 
Log Likelihood -12123.55 
N 24823 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Multilevel Binary Logistic Models of Structural Explanations for the Under-
representation of Women (27 EU States) 
 
Variables  Model 1 
  β         SE 
Model 2 
    β          SE 
Model 3 
    β          SE 
Constant  1.54*     0.15  2.85*     0.73  2.83*     0.76 
Female  0.19*     0.08  0.19*     0.08  0.25*     0.06 
Level 1 Controls    
Married -0.12*     0.05 -0.12*     0.05 -0.12*     0.05 
Young Age 18-29  0.11       0.07  0.11       0.07  0.11       0.07 
Middle/Older Age 45-59  0.02       0.06  0.02       0.06  0.02       0.06 
Old Age 65 plus -0.11       0.08 -0.11       0.08 -0.12       0.08 
Education -0.35       0.19 -0.35       0.19 -0.38       0.20 
White Collar -0.04       0.07 -0.05       0.07 -0.05       0.07 
Manual -0.01       0.08 -0.01       0.08 -0.01       0.08 
Work in Home -0.08       0.09 -0.08       0.09 -0.09       0.08 
Unemployed  0.00       0.13  0.00       0.13  0.01       0.13 
Retired -0.06      0.10 -0.06      0.10 -0.05      0.10 
Political Interest  0.12       0.07  0.12       0.07  0.13       0.07 
Left-Right -0.08*     0.01 -0.08*     0.01 -0.08*     0.01 
Level 2 Variables    
% Women in Parliament -  0.01      0.01  0.01      0.01 
Quota -  0.18      0.13  0.18      0.12 
% Female Labour Force - -0.03*    0.01 -0.03*    0.01 
GDP - -0.06      0.07 -0.05      0.06 
Random Effects    
Intercept Variance 
(var_cons) 
0.12*   0.04  0.08*    0.03  0.09*    0.02 
Slope Variance 
(var_Female) 
- -  0.05*    0.01 
Intercept/Slope Covariance - - -0.01      0.02 
Model Fit    
Wald Chi-Square <0.05 460.62* 525.76* 436.67* 
Log Likelihood -12034.23 -12030.43 -12013.88 
LR test vs Logistic 
Regression 
376.68* 196.35* 229.47* 
N 24823 24823 24823 
*= Significant p= <0.05; (var_cons) = variance of the distribution of the country level u-
intercepts. var(Female) = variance of the distribution of the country level slopes of the log-
odds structural vs female relationship. For the Likelihood ratio test * is Prob>chi2 =0.00. 
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Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects: Blaming Structural Factors 
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Figure 2: Descriptive Breakdown of Endorsement of Blame Assignment Categories across 27 
EU countries (%) 
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Figure 3: Average Marginal Effects: Blaming Political Culture 
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Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects: Sex Effect Across Blame Categories 
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Online Appendix 
 
 
     Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Structural versus Meritocratic by Country 
 
Country Structural 
(79.8%) 
Meritocratic 
(20.2%) 
France 80.2 19.8 
Belgium 75.0 25.0 
Netherlands 66.5 33.5 
Germany 76.3 23.7 
Italy 87.1 12.9 
Luxembourg 66.7 33.3 
Denmark 62.9 37.1 
Ireland 76.7 23.3 
Great Britain 78.4 21.6 
Greece 81.3 18.7 
Spain 88.3 11.7 
Portugal 78.8 21.2 
Finland 74.1 25.9 
Sweden 87.2 12.8 
Austria 77.8 22.2 
Cyprus 70.7 29.3 
Czech Republic 72.1 27.9 
Estonia 67.3 32.7 
Hungary 78.9 21.1 
Latvia 78.1 29.9 
Lithuania 77.2 22.8 
Malta 70.0 30.0 
Poland 78.7 21.3 
Slovakia 73.6 26.4 
Slovenia 78.9 21.1 
Bulgaria 79.0 21.0 
Romania 80.7 19.3 
*All data is weighted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Blaming Structural Explanations: Country by Sex 
 
Country Male 
(47.1%) 
Female 
(52.9%) 
France 49.2 50.8 
Belgium 45.9 54.1 
Netherlands 49.3 50.7 
Germany 45.4 54.6 
Italy 48.2 51.8 
Luxembourg 50.0 50.0 
Denmark 48.5 51.5 
Ireland 46.5 53.5 
Great Britain 49.0 51.0 
Greece 45.6 54.4 
Spain 46.2 53.8 
Portugal 45.8 54.2 
Finland 48.5 51.5 
Sweden 46.9 53.1 
Austria 44.8 55.2 
Cyprus 44.8 55.2 
Czech Republic 45.5 54.5 
Estonia 43.2 56.8 
Hungary 44.9 55.1 
Latvia 43.9 56.1 
Lithuania 41.1 58.9 
Malta 42.9 57.1 
Poland 46.3 53.7 
Slovakia 45.1 54.9 
Slovenia 45.3 54.7 
Bulgaria 44.7 55.3 
Romania 47.5 52.5 
*All data is weighted. The weighted sex frequency for the whole sample is: Female (52.0%); 
Male (48.0%). The figures for Female and Male (column heading) are the breakdown for 
blaming structural explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Variable Description and Measurement 
 
Variables Description Measurement 
Individual Level   
Female Respondents Sex 1 = Female; 0 = Male 
Married Respondents asked about marital 
status 
1 = Married; 0 = All other 
categories 
Young Age 18-29 Respondents Age - Young 1 = Young 18-29; 0 = All 
other age categories 
Middle Age 30-44 Respondents Age - Middle 1 = Middle 30-44; 0 = All 
other age categories 
Middle/Older Age 45-
59 
Respondents Age – 
Middle/Older 
1 = Middle/Older 45-59; 0 = 
All other age categories 
Old Age 65 plus Respondents Age – Old Age 65 
plus 
1 = Old Age 65 plus; 0 = 
All other age categories 
Education Respondents asked whether they 
were still in Education 
1 = Yes; 0 = No 
White Collar Occupation/Employment: 
Respondents in White collar 
occupations  
1 = White Collar; 0 = All 
other categories 
Manual Occupation/Employment: 
Respondents in White collar 
occupations (skilled + unskilled 
manual worker) 
1 = Manual; 0 = All other 
categories 
Work in Home Occupation/Employment Status: 
Respondent asked whether they 
worked at home 
1 = Worked at home; 0 All 
other categories 
Unemployed Occupation/Employment Status: 
Respondent asked whether they 
are unemployed 
1 = Unemployed; 0 All 
other categories 
Retired Occupation/Employment Status: 
Respondent asked whether they 
are retired 
1 = Retired; 0 All other 
categories 
Political Interest Respondent asked whether they 
were interested in politics 
1 = Yes; 0 = No 
Left-Right Respondents self-placement on 
Left-Right scale 
11 point scale: 1 = Hard 
Left; 11 = Hard Right (DK 
take the distribution mean). 
Country level    
Women in Parliament Women in Parliament % of women in the lower 
house/primary legislature  
Female Labour Force % of women in Labour Force 
(by country) 
% women in Labour Force 
Quota Quota Ordinal – 0 = None; 1 = 
Voluntary; 2 = Legally 
Mandated 
GDP GDP per capita GDP – variable 
Standardized  
The quota variable is coded as an ordinal measure which indicates the type of quota, coded 0 
for no quota, 1 for a voluntary party quota, and 2 for a legally mandated quota, either through 
electoral or constitutional law. This data is sourced from either Krook (2009) or The Quota 
Project website, www.quotaproject.org. The percentage of women in the lower house/primary 
legislature was taken from ipu.org. This figure is for the month in which the fieldwork took 
place. GDP per capita is from the World Bank and is reported for the year prior to that in 
which the first fieldwork for the survey was undertaken in each specific country. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=1. Female Employment Rate 
in Service industries is from the World Bank wherever available - Labour force participation 
rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS/countries?page=1. Labour force 
participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically 
active: all people who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a 
specified period - for the year prior to that in which the survey was carried out. 
 
 
Table A4: Mean Random Effects by Country (from Model 1 – Intercepts Model with 
Individual-level Variables Only) 
 
Country Mean (RE Country) 
France .168 
Belgium -.114 
Netherlands -.532 
Germany -.070 
Italy .685 
Luxembourg -.164 
Denmark -.644 
Ireland -.035 
Great Britain .021 
Greece .222 
Spain .758 
Portugal .070 
Finland -.139 
Sweden .584 
Austria .011 
Cyprus -.166 
Czech Republic -.248 
Estonia -.299 
Hungary .115 
Latvia -.353 
Lithuania -.015 
Malta -.117 
Poland .091 
Slovakia -.189 
Slovenia .086 
Bulgaria .070 
Romania .205 
*All data is weighted. Mean (RE Country) = Mean Random Effects for Country 
 
Table A5: Multilevel Binary Logistic Model of Blame Assignment - All Structural 
Explanations for the Under-representation of Women (27 EU States) 
 
Variables  Model 1 
  β         SE 
Model 2 
    β          SE 
Model 3 
    β          SE 
Constant  0.39*     0.16  1.15       0.69  1.23       0.71 
Female  0.12*     0.06  0.12*     0.06  0.20*     0.06 
Level 1 Controls    
Married -0.07*     0.03 -0.07*     0.03 -0.07*     0.03 
Young Age 18-29  0.05       0.06  0.05       0.06  0.05       0.06 
Middle/Older Age 45-59  0.02       0.06  0.02       0.06  0.02       0.06 
Old Age 65 plus -0.21*     0.09 -0.21*     0.09 -0.22*     0.09 
Education -0.04       0.16 -0.04       0.16 -0.06       0.16 
White Collar -0.11*     0.05 -0.11*     0.05 -0.12*     0.05 
Manual -0.10       0.07 -0.10       0.07 -0.11       0.07 
Work in Home -0.01       0.07 -0.01       0.07 -0.03       0.06 
Unemployed -0.03       0.06 -0.03       0.06 -0.02       0.06 
Retired  0.01       0.05  0.01       0.05  0.02       0.05 
Political Interest  0.15*     0.06  0.16*     0.06  0.16*     0.06 
Left-Right -0.06*     0.01 -0.06*     0.01 -0.06*     0.01 
Level 2 Variables    
% Women in Parliament -  0.01      0.01  0.01      0.01 
Quota -  0.12      0.09  0.11      0.09 
% Female Labour Force - -0.02      0.01 -0.02      0.01 
GDP - -0.06      0.05 -0.07      0.04 
Random Effects    
Intercept Variance 
(var_cons) 
0.10*   0.03  0.08*    0.02  0.10*    0.02 
Slope Variance 
(var_Female) 
- -  0.04*    0.01 
Intercept/Slope Covariance - - -0.03      0.02 
Model Fit    
Wald Chi-Square <0.05 1346.22* 4297.43* 3274.74* 
Log Likelihood -16270.24 -16267.51 -16249.84 
N 24823 24823 24823 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Average Marginal Effects: Blaming All Structural Factors (ML Logit: From 
Model 3 – Fixed Effects Only) 
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Table A6: Multinomial Logistic Models of Blame Assignment for the Under-
representation of Women Across 27 EU Countries: Most Responses Structural; Most 
Responses Meritocratic (Base = All Responses Structural) 
 
Variables  Model A1: 
Mostly 
Structural 
   β        SE 
Model A1: 
Mostly 
Meritocratic 
    β        SE 
Bivariate Model   
Constant -0.94*  0.04 -0.96*  0.04 
Sex   
Female -0.04    0.05 -0.19*  0.05 
Model Fit   
LR Chi-Square  13.91* 13.91* 
Log Likelihood -23804.13 -23804.13 
AIC 47616.26 47616.26 
Variables  Model A2: 
Mostly 
Structural 
   β        SE 
Model A2: 
Mostly 
Meritocratic 
    β        SE 
Full Model   
Constant -1.17*  0.12 -1.46*  0.13 
Sex   
Female -0.02    0.05 -0.17*  0.05 
Model Fit   
LR Chi-Square  115.79* 115.79* 
Log Likelihood -23692.66 -23692.66 
AIC 47441.33 47441.33 
N 24823 24823 
*Significant at the <0.05 level. All Structural N = 13144; Most Responses Structural N = 
5784; Most Responses Meritocratic N = 5895 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Average Marginal Effects: Sex Effect Across Blame Categories (All 
Responses – Categories Include All Structural; Mostly Structural and Mostly 
Meritocratic) 
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Table A7: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Blaming Political Culture for the 
Under-representation of Women (27 EU states) 
 
Variables  Model 1 
     β         SE    AMEs 
Model 2 
    β          SE      AMEs 
Constant   -0.04     0.03      - -0.25*     0.11        - 
Female    0.17*   0.04    0.04  0.13*     0.05      0.03 
Level 1 Controls   
Married -  0.02       0.05        
Young Age 18-29 - -0.00       0.07         
Middle/Older Age 45-59 -  0.09       0.06         
Old Age 65 plus -  0.11       0.09         
Education - -0.39       0.30         
White Collar -  0.13       0.08          
Manual -  0.24*     0.07      0.06 
Work in Home -  0.37*     0.10      0.09 
Unemployed -  0.32*     0.09      0.08 
Retired -  0.30*     0.09     0.07 
Political Interest - -0.01       0.07 
Left-Right - -0.00       0.01 
Model Fit   
Wald Chi-Square <0.05 14.43* 63.20* 
Log Likelihood -13525.93 -13464.94 
AIC 27055.85 26957.88 
N 18928 18928 
*Significant <0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8: Multinomial Logistic Models of Attitudes Towards the Under-representation 
of Women Across 27 EU Countries: Structural Factors - Blame Parties; Society; Elites 
(Base = Political Culture) 
 
Variables  Model A1 
Parties 
 
   β        SE 
Model A1 
Society 
 
    β        SE 
Model A1 
Elites 
 
 β        SE 
Bivariate Model    
Constant -1.78*  0.06 -0.55*  0.04 -1.23*  0.05 
Sex    
Female -0.15    0.08 -0.14*  0.05 -0.25*  0.07 
Model Fit    
LR Chi-Square  17.30* 17.30* 17.30* 
Log Likelihood -22772.55 -22772.55 -22772.55 
AIC 45557.10 45557.10 45557.10 
Variables  Model A2 
Parties 
 
   β        SE 
Model A2 
Society 
 
    β        SE 
Model A2 
Elites 
 
   β        SE 
Full Model    
Constant -1.88*  0.23 -0.08    0.13 -1.42*  0.17 
Sex    
Female -0.14    0.09 -0.09    0.05 -0.19*  0.07 
Model Fit    
LR Chi-Square  172.32* 172.32* 172.32* 
Log Likelihood -22592.05 -22592.05 -22592.05 
AIC 45268.09 45268.09 45268.09 
N 18928 18928 18928 
*Significant <0.05. *Note: ‘Blame Political Culture’ is the base category for Models A1 and 
A2. Models A1 = Bivariate impact of sex only; Models A2 = Full model including all 
individual level variables. Weighted EU 27 countries weight; Full model contains all 
predictors. Key: Women placed low on the lists = Blame Parties (1479); Stereotype (Women 
not suited to politics) = Blame Society (5089) Men do not value women skills + Media play 
less attention to women = Blame Political Culture (9651); Measures to encourage parity are 
ineffective = Blame Elites (2709).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9: Multinomial logistic models of attitudes towards the under-representation of 
women across 27 EU countries: Structural Factors - Blame Parties; Society; Elites; 
Meritocratic Factors – Blame Women (Base = Political Culture) 
 
Variables  Model A1 
Parties 
 
   β        SE 
Model A1 
Society 
 
    β        SE 
Model A1 
Elites 
 
 β        SE 
Model A1 
Women 
 
 β        SE 
Bivariate Model     
Constant -1.78*  0.06 -0.55*  0.04 -1.23*  0.05 -0.58*  0.04 
Sex     
Female -0.15    0.08 -0.14*  0.05 -0.25*  0.07 -0.26*  0.05 
Model Fit     
LR Chi-Square  30.30* 30.30* 30.30* 30.30* 
Log Likelihood -35068.33 -35068.33 -35068.33 -35068.33 
AIC 70152.66 70152.66 70152.66 70152.66 
Variables  Model A2 
Parties 
 
   β        SE 
Model A2 
Society 
 
    β        SE 
Model A2 
Elites 
 
   β        SE 
Model A2 
Women 
 
   β        SE 
Full Model     
Constant -1.87*  0.23 -0.08    0.13 -1.43*  0.17 -0.90*  0.13 
Sex     
Female -0.15    0.09 -0.09    0.05 -0.19*  0.07 -0.23*  0.05 
Model Fit     
LR Chi-Square  248.95* 248.95* 248.95* 248.95* 
Log Likelihood -34814.74 -34814.74 -34814.74 -34814.74 
AIC 69741.49 69741.49 69741.49 69741.49 
N 24823 24823 24823 24823 
*Significant <0.05. *Note: For the purposes of brevity, we include a multinomial logistic 
regression with both structural and meritocratic factors included on the whole sample/full 
dataset. There are little or no substantial differences in the findings with the previous analyses 
that contained structural factors only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Average Marginal Effects: Sex Effect Across Blame Categories (All 
Responses – Includes Structural and Meritocratic Categories) 
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